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In this paper, we aim to empirically examine the value of website usage and sellers’
listing behavior in the two leading Internet auctions sites, eBay and Yahoo!Auctions. The
descriptive data analysis of the seller’s equilibrium listing behavior indicates that a
seller’s higher expected auction revenue from eBay is correlated with a lager number of
potential bidders measured by website usage per listing. Our estimation results, based on
the logarithm specifications of sellers’ expected auction revenues and potential bidders’
website usage, show that in a median case, (i) 1 percent increase of the unique visitors
(page views) per listed item induces 0.022 (0.007) percent increase of a seller’s expected
auction revenue; and (ii) 1 percent increase of sellers’ listings induces 1.99 (4.74) percent
increase of the unique visitors (page views). Since increased expected auction revenues
will induce more listings, we can infer positive feedback effects between the number of
listings and website usage. Consequently, Yahoo!Auctions, which has substantially less
listings, has greater incentives to increase listings via these feedback effects which are
reflected in its fee schedules.
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1I. Introduction
For the last two and a half years, the fluctuation of the market value of an e-commerce
firm has been huge. First, the potential growth of e-commerce has hit the stock market: due to the
Internet related stocks, the Nasdaq composite index went up more than 70 percent in 1999. Then,
the enthusiasm of the Wall Street was struck by disappointing profits and worries about slowing
economy. Between December of 1999 and August of 2001, the stock price of eBay peaked at
$127.50, plunged to $26.75, and then bounced back to the range of $50 to $70. During the same
time period, the stock prices of Yahoo! and Amazon.com continuously plunged from the level of
$250 to the level of $10 and from the level of $110 to the level of $8, respectively. The valuation
of Internet stocks is particularly difficult mainly because e-commerce is still only in the beginning
stage and its potential outreach is believed to be huge.1 Hence, it is speculated that accounting
information such as bottom-line net income is usually of limited use in the valuation of Internet
stocks. Instead, website usage measured by ‘unique visitors’ or ‘page views’2 is often considered
as a good proxy for the potential growth and profitability of an e-commerce firm in the future. For
example, Trueman, Wong and Zhang (2000) found that Internet usage provides considerable
explanatory power for the prices of some Internet stocks (before the plunge in 2000). The recent
plunge of e-commerce firms’ stock prices, however, may cast doubts on this argument.
In this paper, we aim to empirically examine the value of website usage in a particular e-
commerce called Internet auctions. We are specifically interested in: (i) how website usage
affects a seller’s expected auction revenue; and (ii) whether there exist positive feedback effects
between the number of listings and website usage. We begin by raising a question why website
                                                          
1 Although the potential outreach of e-commerce is believed to be huge, online sales still remain a small
portion of total retail sales. In 1998, electronic retailing sales accounted for 0.5 percent of all sales, and in
1999, they are projected to account for 1.2 percent (see “Survey Show Online Sales up 300%,” The New
York Times, December 29, 1999).
2 ‘Unique visitors’ is the estimated number of different individuals who visit a firm’s website, and ‘page
views’ is the number of unique visitors multiplied by the average unique pages viewed per visitor.
2usage is a valuable (or relevant) information in Internet auctions. As indicated in the literature of
auction theory (see Levin and Smith (1994); Bulow and Klemperer (1996)), the seller’s expected
auction revenue depends on the number of the potential bidders. Hence, when a seller decides
which Internet auctions site he/she will list his/her item on, he/she may refer to website usage (as
well as number of other listings) for the number of potential bidders in an Internet auctions site.
In the paper, therefore, we will understand the value of website usage as a relevant information on
the size of potential bidders. Specifically, we will assume that a seller’s expectation for the
number of potential bidders in an Internet auction site is proportional to the website usage per
listed item on the site. We will also consider that website usage may be not exogenously
determined but influenced by the number of listings. A potential bidder may prefer to log on to an
Internet auctions site with a larger number of listings because the probability that he/she may find
an item to bid for will be greater. On the other hand, in the case of the common value auctions,
the bidder’s expected profits may fall with additional bidders due to the effects of the winner’s
curse.3 Hence, it will be an empirical question whether increased listings will induce more or less
usage in Internet auctions.
Based on our unique weekly data of the first 17 weeks of the year 2001, we will
empirically analyze the relationship between sellers’ listing behavior and website usage in the
two dominant Internet auctions sites, eBay and Yahoo!Auctions, which are believed to occupy
more than 90 percent of Internet auctions.4 Indeed, the comparison between eBay and
Yahoo!Auctions may be ideal for our quest for positing a simplest model for the relationship
between sellers’ listing behavior and website usage. In equilibrium, a seller’s expected revenues
from listing an item on any auction website must be the same. The seller’s expected revenue from
listing the item on an Internet auctions site depends on both the expected auction revenue and the
                                                          
3 Bajari and Hortacsu (2001) showed that for a representative sample of eBay’s coin auctions, a bidder’s
expected profits fall by 3.2 percent when the expected number of bidders increases by one.
3fees charged by the site. The comparison of listing fees between eBay and Yahoo!Auctions
indicates that a seller will expect less revenues from auctioning the same item in Yahoo!Auctions
than in eBay. Since there is almost no difference in available auction formats and other
characteristics between the two largest Internet auctions, differences in the seller’s expected
auction revenues between these two Internet auctions might be caused by different sizes of
potential bidders. Our data indicate that eBay has a lager number of potential bidders measured
by website usage per listed item. Hence, we can infer that a seller’s expected auction revenue
increases with the number of potential bidders in Internet auctions. Our data also show larger
website usage and more listings on eBay.
To quantify the extent to which the seller’s expected auction revenue is affected by the
number of potential bidders and the extent to which the website usage of an Internet auctions site
is affected by its own and its rival’s listings, we will further specify a seller’s expected auction
revenue function and the website usage function. Due to virtual no difference in available auction
formats and other characteristics between the two largest Internet auctions, we will, without
modeling specific auction mechanism, assume a simple logarithm specification of sellers’
expected auction revenues. We will also specify the website usage of an Internet auctions site as a
logarithm function of the number of listings on its own site and its rival’s. Our estimation results
show that 1 percent increase of the unique visitors (page views) per listed item induces 0.022
(0.007) percent increase of a seller’s expected auction revenue. Furthermore, 1 percent increase of
sellers’ listings induces 1.99 (4.74) percent increase of the unique visitors (page views). Since
increased expected auction revenues will induce more listings, we can infer positive feedback
effects between the number of listings and website usage. Consequently, Yahoo!Auctions, which
has substantially less listings, has greater incentives to increase listings via these feedback effects
which are reflected in its fee schedules.
                                                                                                                                                                            
4 As quoted in Lucking-Reiley (2000), an eBay Vice President said in January 2000 that eBay’s market
share in the Internet auctions market has remained at approximately 90 percent, which is consistent with the
4The organization of the paper is as follows. Section II provides a brief review of Internet
auctions. Section III discusses sellers’ equilibrium listing behavior and usage of Internet auctions
sites. Section IV adopts logarithm specifications of a seller’s expected auction revenue and the
usage equation and discusses our quantitative analyses. Section V concludes the paper.
II. Internet Auctions and Descriptive Statistics
An Internet auctions site, such as eBay and Yahoo!Auctions, acts as a listing agent,
allowing individual sellers to register their items for its website and running Web-based
automatic auctions on their behalf.5 Actual exchanges including payment and shipment are
worked out by the buyer and the seller on their own. The English auctions have been the most
dominant format in Internet auctions. However, sellers usually have some control over these
Web-based auctions, choosing a set of different parameters for each auction such as the duration
days, an opening value, and an optional secrete reserve price. A variety of goods are auctioned in
Internet auctions, but the largest category by far has been the collectibles. Each Internet auctions
site has different categories, and there is usually no one top-level category that includes all the
types of collectibles. During the first 17 weeks of the year 2001, 55.8 percent of listings on eBay
belong to one of the categories such as ‘antiques & art’, ‘collectibles’, ‘books, movies, music’,
‘coins & stamps’, ‘dolls & doll houses’, or ‘toys, bean bag plush’. During the same time period,
61.9 percent of listings of Yahoo!Auctions were included in one of the following categories,
‘antique, art & collectibles’, ‘sports cards & memorabilia’, ‘toys & games & hobbies’, or ‘coins,
paper money & stamps’.
                                                                                                                                                                            
revenue estimates in Lucking-Reiley (2000). Refer to section II for details.
5 There have been retail merchants such as Onsale and Egghead who use the auction format to sell their
products. In this paper, we narrowly define Internet auctions as consumer-to-consumer transactions via
listing agents.
5Internet auctions began in 1995 and have been growing rapidly. As of fall 1999, Internet
auctions sites are estimated to have almost $100 million revenues per month. Since the beginning
of Internet auctions, eBay has maintained a dominant leading position although the popular
attention and the profitability of eBay induced entries of two biggest e-commerce firms, Yahoo!
in October 1998 and Amazon.com in March 1999. As quoted in Lucking-Reiley (2000), an eBay
Vice President said in January 2000 that eBay’s market share in the Internet auctions market has
remained at approximately 90 percent, which is consistent with the revenue estimates in Lucking-
Reiley (2000). As of summer 1999, eBay had 340,000 auctions closing per day while
Yahoo!Auctions and Amazon.com had only 88,000 auctions and 10,000 auctions, respectively.
Refer to Lucking-Reiley (2000) for detailed surveys on Internet auctions.
Our more up-to-dated information on listings and website usage is supportive of the
dominance of eBay and the growth of Yahoo!Auctions. During the first 17 weeks of the year
2001, we have countered the number of listings on both eBay and Yahoo!Auctions every
Wednesday. Like most Internet auctions sites, eBay and Yahoo!Auctions allow sellers to choose
their own auction length. At eBay, sellers can choose a length of 3, 5, or 7 days and a length of 10
days with an extra fee of $0.10 while at Yahoo!Auctions, sellers can choose a length between 2
and 14 days. Due to the longer possible duration days, our weekly counting of listings may
relatively overstate the number of new listings on Yahoo!Auctions. However, in the survey of
Lucking-Reiley (2000), a modal length of duration is 7 days.
The data of weekly website usage (unique visitors and page views) of these two auctions
sites are obtained from Nielsen//NetRatings during the same time period. However, we do not
have the usage information on eBay in the first week of March nor the usage information on
Yahoo!Auctions in the first week of January. As illustrated in figure 1,6 during the first 17 weeks
of 2001, eBay and Yahoo!Auctions had about 5,822,000 and 3,349,000 listed items on weekly
6average, respectively, while Amazon.com, the third largest Internet Auctions site, had only
769,000 listed items on weekly average.7 The dominance of eBay in Internet auctions is more
obvious in terms of website usage. As illustrated in figures 2 and 3, during the same time period,
eBay had about 6,250,000 unique visitors and 763,6378,000 page views on weekly average while
Yahoo!Auctions had 527,000 unique visitors and 1,726,000 page views on weekly average.
Relatively small differences in the numbers of listings between eBay and
Yahoo!Auctions (compared to differences in website usage and closing auctions) may be mainly
due to different listing fees. eBay charges two types of basic fees to sellers: insertion fees and
final value fees.8 The insertion fees of eBay range from $0.30 to $3.30, depending on the opening
values (called also reserve prices or minimum bid levels) while the final value fees are 5 percent
of the sale price (called also closing value) up to $24.99, 2.5 percent from $25.00 up to $1000.00,
and 1.25 percent over $1000.00. On the other hand, Yahoo!Auctions charges only insertion fees
ranging from $0.20 to $1.50 (see table 1). Table 1 indicates that eBay charges slightly higher
insertion fees for all the ranges of opening values. A seller can ex ante choose not only an
opening value but also a secret reserve price.9 The fees for the secret reserve price auctions are
fully refundable if the item is sold. The basic fees of Internet auctions have not changed
frequently. Indeed, Yahoo!Auctions began to charge insertion fees in the beginning of the year
2001. At the same time, eBay raised its insertion fees a little bit to the levels shown in table 1. It
is noteworthy that before and after the changes of insertion fees, the number of listings on eBay
increased slightly while that on Yahoo!Auctions declined considerably. As of fall 2000, eBay and
Yahoo!Auctions had about 5,671,000 and 4,045,000 listed items on weekly average, respectively.
                                                                                                                                                                            
6 Figure 1 may give a false impression that the number of listings has a downward trend. A longer-period
observations of weekly data since February of 2000, however, indicate that the number of listings may
fluctuate but have a slightly upward trend on both Internet auctions sites.
7 Except these three largest generalist auctioneers, other small Internet auctions sites usually serve small
niche markets.
8 eBay and Yahoo!Auctions also charge non-refundable fees for several optional seller features, such as
home page featured, highlight, bold, etc., which may promote the seller’s listing to receive more bids.
7It is also noteworthy that Amazon.com has charged $0.10 insertion fee and final value fees at the
rates of eBay since it entered. Consequently, Amazon.com has had less than a quarter of the
listings on Yahoo!Auctions.
III. The Model
A seller will decide which Internet auctions site he/she will list his/her item on. The
seller’s expected revenue from listing the item on Internet auctions site j depends on the expected
revenue from auctioning the item and the fees charged by site j. There are two types of fees to
sellers: insertion fees, say Fj, and final value fees, say αj. Let Rj denote the seller’s expected
auction revenue from site j. Then the seller’s expected revenue from listing his/her item on
Internet auctions site j is:
(1) jjj FR −− )1( α .
In equilibrium, the seller’s expected revenues from listing the item on any auction website must
be the same. Then for any two auctions sites, say e and y, we have in equilibrium:
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As discussed in section II, both eBay and Yahoo!Auctions charge insertion fees, ranging
from $0.30 to $3.30 and $0.20 from to $1.50, respectively (see table 1). Yahoo!Auctions does not
charge final value fees, but at eBay, the final value fees are 5 percent of the sale price up to
                                                                                                                                                                            
9 If the secret reserve price is not met by the close of the auction, the item will not be sold. In practice, a
seller sets a low opening value with a high secret reserve price to attract bidders who may drive up the
8$24.99, 2.5 percent from $25.00 up to $1000.00, and 1.25 percent over $1000.00. A seller’s
choice of an opening value (and thus an insertion fee) may depend on the number of potential
bidders. As documented in Lucking-Reiley (1999) and Bajari and Hortacsu (2001), opening value
is believed to be the most important determinant of entry of bidders in Internet auctions. In
practice, sellers usually set a low opening value to attract more bidders in Internet auctions.10 The
survey of Lucking-Reiley (2000) indicates that as of fall 1998, most of collectibles traded on
Internet auctions are relatively inexpensive with median prices well below $100. In the U.S.
mint/proof coin sets auctions on eBay, as reported in Bajari and Hortacsu (2001), the average
opening value was $16.28 while the average value of the traded coins is $47. Hence, in the paper,
we will consider as a median case a seller listing an expected auction value of $50 on eBay with
an opening value between $0.10 and $24.99. Hence, the equilibrium condition in (2) indicates
that a median seller will expect about 4 percent less revenues from auctioning the same item on
Yahoo!Auctions than on eBay.11
As pointed out in the literature of auction theory, a seller’s expected revenue auctioning
on site j depends on several factors such as the number of potential bidders, say Nj, and available
auction mechanisms, say mj, such as available auction formats and a set of parameters which the
seller can choose in each auction. That is, Rj = R(Nj, mj), where R is a real function. Since both
eBay and Yahoo!Auctions offer almost the same choices of auction formats and auction
parameters, we can infer that a seller’s different expected auction revenues from eBay and
Yahoo!Auctions mainly result from the different numbers of potential bidders. As discussed in
section I, we assume that a seller’s expectation for the number of potential bidders is proportional
to the website usage per listed item. In fact, eBay has substantially larger website usage per listed
                                                                                                                                                                            
price.
10 As indicated in Lucking-Reiley (2000), the conventional wisdom seems to be that $0 opening value plus
a $50 secret reserve price would be more profitable to the seller than a $50 opening value with no secret
reserve price.
11 If the final value on eBay auctions is $50 with an insertion fee of $0.55, then the seller will pay the total
fee equal to $2.425 (= $25(0.05) + $25(0.025) + $0.55) on eBay auctions, while the seller will pay only an
9item (as well as substantially more listed items and larger website usage as discussed in section
II) than Yahoo!Auctions: during the first 17 weeks of 2001, the average weekly unique visitors
per listed item are 1.07 for eBay and 0.16 for Yahoo!Auctions, and the average weekly page
views per listed item are 131.2 for eBay and 0.52 for Yahoo! Auctions (see figures 4 and 5).
Therefore, the equilibrium condition of the listing behavior in (2), combined with our empirical
observations on listing fees, available auction mechanisms, and sizes of potential bidders, implies
that a seller expects a higher auction revenue on eBay than on Yahoo!Auctions and this higher
expected auction revenue is positively correlated with a lager number of potential bidders. Note
that our descriptive analysis does not assume any specific auction mechanism nor private-value or
common-value settings.12
Equation (2) describes equilibrium listings for given website usage. Website usage,
however, may be not exogenously determined but influenced by the number of listings. A
potential bidder may prefer to log on to an Internet auctions site with a larger number of listings
because the probability that he/she may find an item to bid for will be greater. On the other hand,
in the case of the common value auctions, the bidder’s expected profit may fall with additional
bidders due to the effects of the winner’s curse. Bajari and Hortacsu (2001) argued that their
empirical findings of eBay auctions were more consistent with common-value auctions than
private-value auctions. Hence, it will be an empirical question whether increased listings will
induce more or less usage in Internet auctions. The comparison between eBay and
Yahoo!Auctions as shown in figures 1 – 3, however, indicates that larger usage is strongly
correlated with more listings in Internet auctions.
                                                                                                                                                                            
insertion fee of $0.35 on Yahoo!Auctions. Hence the seller will pay $2.075 more fees on eBay, which is
approximately 4 percent of the final value.
12 Amazon.com, the third largest Internet auctions site, is not included in our analysis for several reasons.
First, we do not have an access to website usage data of auctions on Amazon.com. We were told that
Nielsen//NetRatings did not collect usage data of auctions separately from the usage data of Amazon.com
as a whole because website usage of auctions on Amazon.com is not substantially large. Second, although
Amazon.com is the third largest Internet auctions site, it is considerably smaller than Yahoo!Auctions, the
second largest. Lastly, Amazon.com offers various different auction formats and cannot be directly
compared with the two leading sites without positing specific auction mechanisms.
10
In general, we can describe website usage of site j, say Uj, as a function of its own
listings, say Lj, the others’ listings, say L-j, and the other factors, say Oj, such as the influence of
the other auctions sites and potential bidders’ unobservable preferences of site j.
(3) Uj = U(Lj, L-j, Oj),
where U is a real function.
IV. Quantitative Analyses
In this section, we will specify a seller’s expected auction revenue function, R(Nj, mj),
and a usage equation, U(Lj, L-j, Oj), in order to quantify the effects of the number of potential
bidders on the seller’s expected revenue and the effects of listings on website usage. Due to
almost no difference in available auction formats and other characteristics between eBay and
Yahoo!Auctions, we will, without modeling specific auction mechanism, assume a simple
logarithm specification of a seller’s expected auction revenue as follows:
(4) R aN ej j
b j
=
ξ
,
where a and b are parameters, and ξj represents any exogenous factors, such as the seller’s
idiosyncratic beliefs or certain weekly effects on auction revenues, which are not correlated with
the sizes of potential bidders. In equation (4), a reflects the influences of available auction
mechanisms, which are common to both eBay and Yahoo!Auctions, while b measures the
elasticity of the seller’s expected revenue with respect to the expected number of potential
bidders. As discussed in section I, we assume that Nj = γ(Uj / Lj) where γ is a positive real number.
11
Based on the seller’s expected auction revenue function in (4), we will use the
equilibrium condition of listing behavior in (2) to estimate b, the elasticity of the seller’s expected
revenue with respect to the expected number of potential bidders. The estimation based directly
on the equilibrium condition of (2), however, causes several difficulties. First of all, the
equilibrium condition in (2) leads to a complicated nonlinear estimating equation. With 15-week
aggregate listings and usage data, we may not expect to obtain any significant estimates from this
complicated nonlinear estimating equation. Moreover, even with disaggregate (a huge amount of)
seller-level data, the parameter a then must be indexed by each item listed by sellers. In order to
avoid too many different parameters (different a’s indexed by item), we may have to posit a
certain structural model of the auction mechanism. Hence, to keep our analysis simple and robust
to specific auction mechanisms, we will simplify the equilibrium condition of (2), calculating an
auction premium of eBay equivalent to the difference in insertion and final value fees (between
eBay and Yahoo!Auctions) in the median case. As discussed in section II, in the median case, the
seller’s expected revenue from auctioning his/her item on eBay is about $50 with an opening
value between $10.00 and $25.00. Then in this median case, the seller will expect approximately
4 percent less auction revenue on Yahoo!Auctions,13 and hence, the equilibrium condition in (2)
can be rewritten as follows:
(5) ey RR /1 =−α ,
where α  = 0.04. Note that if the seller’s expected revenue from auctioning his/her item on eBay
is about $100 with an opening value between $10.00 and $25.00, then α  = 0.033.14
Then from (4) and (5), we can obtain the following estimating equation:
                                                          
13 Refer to footnote 11.
14 If the final value on eBay auctions is $100 with an insertion fee of $0.55, then the seller will pay the total
fee equal to $3.675 (= $25(0.05) + $75(0.025) + $0.55) on eBay auctions, while the seller will pay only an
12
(6) εα +−=−− )}/ln()/{ln()1ln( yyee LULUb ,
where ε =ξe − ξy. Since ξj is not correlated with the numbers of potential bidders, we can apply an
OLS estimation procedure for (6). Table 2 reports these estimation results. Our estimation results,
indicate that in the median case (α  = 0.04), 1 percent increase of unique visitors (page views) per
listed item induces 0.0217 (0.007) percent increase of a seller’s expected auction revenue. In the
case that a seller’s expected auction revenue on eBay is about $100 with an opening value
between $10.00 and $25.00 (α  = 0033), 1 percent increase of unique visitors (page views) per
listed item induces 0.0178 (0.006) percent increase of a seller’s expected auction revenue. The
estimates of b in either case are stochastically very significant. Due to the fee structures of eBay
and Yahoo!Auctions, as the seller’s expected auction revenue increases, α  will decrease. Hence
table 2 also indicates that the elasticity of the seller’s expected auction revenue with respect to the
number of potential bidders decreases as the seller’s expected auction revenue increases.
In Internet auctions, website usage may be influenced by the number of listings. As
discussed in section III, larger usage is strongly correlated with more listings in Internet auctions.
To quantify the effects of listings on website usage, our quest here is for a simple specification of
the usage equation in (3) without specifying the probability that a seller find an item to bid for nor
the auction mechanism. We will use a logarithm specification as follows:
(7) U L L ej j j
c j
=
−
+β β η1 2 ,
                                                                                                                                                                            
insertion fee of $0.35 on Yahoo!Auctions. Hence the seller will pay $3.325 more fees on eBay, which is
approximately 3.3 percent of the final value.
13
where β1 and β2 are parameters, c is a constant, and ηj reflects potential bidders’ unobservable
preferences of site j, which are correlated with listings. β1 and β2 measure the elasticity of website
usage of an Internet auctions site with respect to its own listings and its rival’s listings,
respectively. c and ηj represent the other factors, Oj, in (3), and thus c reflects the common
influences of the other auctions sites on these two Internet auctions sites.
Taking logarithm on both sides of (7), we can obtain the following estimating equation:
(8) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )U L L cj j j j= + + +−β β η1 2 .
Since ηj is not correlated with Lj and L-j, we will apply an OLS estimation procedure. Table 3
reports the estimation results of the estimating equation (8). All the estimates, regardless of the
measurements of website usage, are statistically very significant. The estimation results indicate
that 1 percent increase of sellers’ listings on a site induces 1.99 (4.74) percent increase of the
unique visitors (page views) on its own site and 1.88 (4.72) percent decrease of the unique
visitors (page views) on its rival’s site. As implied by the estimation results in table 2, if 1 percent
increase in the number of listings induce more than 1 percent increase of website usage, then the
expected auction revenue will be raised by these increased listings. Hence, the estimation results
of table 3 indicate that an increase in listings will eventually raise the seller’s expected auction
revenue in an Internet auctions site. Since increased expected auction revenues will induce more
listings, we can infer positive feedback effects between the number of listings and website usage.
Consequently, Yahoo!Auctions, which has substantially less listings, has greater incentives to
increase listings via these feedback effects which are reflected in its fee schedules.
V. Concluding Remarks
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In this paper, we empirically examine the value of website usage and the relationship
between usage and listings in the two leading Internet auctions sites, eBay and Yahoo!Auctions.
Our quantitative analyses show that 1 percent increase of unique visitors (page views) per listed
item induces 0.022 (0.007) percent increase of a seller’s expected auction revenue. Furthermore,
we can infer positive feedback effects between the number of listings and website usage, which
are similar to the indirect network effects documented in the market for Yellow Pages as in
Rysman (2000) and in the VCR cases as in Park (2001). The existence of these positive feedback
effects may provide explanations for why eBay, the start-up company in Internet auctions, has
been able to maintain its dominant position and why Yahoo!Auctions, a later entrant, set lower
insertion fees and no final value fees.
In Internet auctions, a seller can not restrict the number of potential bidders of a certain
site but can choose an auction site based on the sizes of potential bidders. Our empirical finding
invites more theoretical and empirical studies on the relationship between the number of potential
bidders and a seller’s expected auction revenue. The theoretical predictions on this relationship
depend on whether potential bidders’ entry to an auction is endogenous or not. Levin and Smith
(1994), based on the equilibrium analyses of auctions with endogenous entry, concluded that the
expected revenue of any seller who uses her optimal mechanism decreases with the number of
potential bidders in a mixed-strategy entry equilibrium.15 Hence, if the number of potential
bidders is too high, the seller can be better off ex ante by restricting the number of potential
bidders. On the other hand, Bulow and Klemperer (1996) showed that very generally in a private-
value auction and also in a wide class of common-value auctions, a simple ascending auction with
no reserve price and N+1 symmetric bidders is more profitable to the seller than any realistic
auction with N of these bidders. At a first glance, our empirical finding that a seller’s expected
auction revenue increases with the number of potential bidders in Internet auctions seems to be
more consistent with the presumption in Bulow and Klemperer (1996). However, the
15
experimental evidence of eBay auctions in Lucking-Reiley (1999) was supportive of stochastic
endogenous entry in Internet auctions.
Our intuition for this discrepancy between the theoretical prediction and our empirical
finding in Internet auctions is that any Internet auctions site may not have reached the sufficient
number of potential bidders (or n* in Levin and Smith (1994)). As reported in Bajari and
Hortacsu (2001), the average number of bidders for U.S. mint/proof coin sets was only 3 on eBay
auctions. The stochastic entry reported in Lucking-Reiley (1999) and Bajari and Hortacsu (2001)
may be generated not by mixed strategies but by other things happening in bidders’ lives as
discussed in Lucking-Reiley (1999). In reality, sellers pay more fees for featured auctions and set
low opening values (usually with higher secret reserve prices) to attract more bidders in Internet
auctions. As we discussed, a huge number of website usage of eBay or Yahoo!Auctions is met by
a great number of sellers listing their items. The positive feedback effects between usage and
listings may be a source of growing Internet auctions but keep usage per listing from rising
significantly.
                                                                                                                                                                            
15 A mixed-strategy entry equilibrium occurs because there are too many potential bidders.
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         Table 1: Fees
              eBay   Yahoo!Auctions
Insertion Fees
  Opening Value $0.01-$9.99 $0.30 $0.20
$10.00-$24.99 $0.55 $0.35
$25.00-49.99 $1.10 $0.75
$50.00-$199.99 $2.20 $1.50
$200.00and up $3.30 $1.50
Final Value Fees
 Closing Value $0-$25 5%                  Free
$25-$1000 2.50%                  Free
over $1000 1.25%                  Free
 
 
Table 2: Regression of Expected Auction Revenues
Elasticity w.r.t. potential bidders estimate  standard error
alpha bar = 0.04
  Usage is measured by unique visitors 0.0216 0.0004
  Usage is measured by page views 0.0074 0.00007
alpha bar = 0.033
  Usage is measured by unique visitors 0.0178 0.0003
  Usage is measured by page views 0.0061 0.00006
 
alpha bar = 0.025   
  Usage is measured by unique visitors 0.0134 0.0003
  Usage is measured by page views 0.0046 0.00004
Number of observations 15
 
 
Table 3: Regression of Website Usage
 Variables estimate  standard error
  Usage is measured by unique visitors
constant 6.564 1.875
own listings 1.989 0.146
rival's listings -1.876 0.146
  
   R-squared 0.94
 
  Usage is measured by page views  
constant  10.289 4.986
own listings 4.743 0.389
rival's listings -4.718 0.389
   
   R-squared 0.93
Number of observations 30
Figure 1: Listings (unit: thousands)
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Figure 2: Unique Visitors (unit: thousands)
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Figure 3: Page Views (unit: thousands)
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Figure 4: Unique Visitors / Listings
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Figure 5: Page Views / Listings
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